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ABSTRACT
In this article, we analyze the asset and liability management and market risk
systems of insurance companies. We discuss that the current system is not goal
congruent and does not satisfy necessary conditions for effective control. It fol-
lows that managers are unable to run their business effectively. We develop a
transfer pricing system that allows the clear separation of underwriting and
investment activities, both on the risk and return aspects. It creates the appro-
priate incentive schemes. We illustrate this system with an example indicating
the differences in incentives between the traditional embedded value measures
and the proposed funds transfer pricing system.
INTRODUCTION
Adequate risk management requires a system for effective management control based
on the risk profile. In this article, we analyze the system that is currently in place in
insurance firms to monitor asset and liability management (ALM) and market risks.
We argue that because insurance firms cannot separate risk and result components,
the current system does not satisfy the necessary conditions for effective management
control (second section). Therefore, we adjust the so-called funds transfer pricing system
that is used in banking (third section) so that it can be implemented in insurance firms
(fourth section). Based on our experience, only a few insurance firms apply such a
system for effective management control. We conclude with a practical example (fifth
section) indicating the differences in incentives between the traditional embedded value
measures and the proposed funds transfer pricing system.
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ASSET AND LIABILITY RISKS AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL
To manage and measure market risks, insurance firms generally apply ALM (Doff, 2007;
Booth, 1999). Smink (1995) distinguishes macro-ALM and micro-ALM. Macro-ALM con-
sists of the strategic choices regarding the product portfolio, capital structure, and the
risk profile/appetite of the firm. It includes three elements: (1) investment policy, that
is, micro-ALM (see below); (2) actuarial policy, that is, the evaluation process of under-
writing variables like claims and mortality; and (3) premium policy, that is, determining
how much of the investment income is allocated back to the policyholders. Micro-ALM
(also called matching) is the choice of investment tactics to hedge the financial risks of a
given liability structure (also see: Van der Aalst, 1995; KPMG, 2002).
Management control is the process by which managers influence other members of the
organization to implement the organization’s strategy (Anthony, 1988). In organizations,
incentives must be created so that the objectives of agents and principals are aligned.
Anthony and Govindarajan (2003) state: “The central purpose of a management control
system is to ensure . . . goal congruence. In a goal congruent process the actions people
are led to take in accordance with their perceived self-interest are also in the best inter-
est of the organisation.” One way to achieve goal congruence is to link rewards to the
performance of the agent. Performance measures are essential components of manage-
ment control. We will argue below that currently underwriting managers’ performance
measures are not always goal congruent.
De Leeuw (1990) defines the conditions for effective control (Pape, 1999):
1. There must be an objective/goal; otherwise goal-directed influence is not possible.
2. A model of the controlled unit must be available, such that the controlling entity
can predict the effect of its control.
3. Information on the state of the controlled unit and the environment must be avail-
able, such that the controlling entity knows which controlling measure to choose.
4. Sufficient measures should be available to react to disruptions. The variety of
controlling measures should be at least as large as the variety of disruptions (law
of requisite variety).
5. The controlling entity should have sufficient information capacity to transform
new information into an effective control measure/action.
Insurers have started to identify the weaknesses in their current performance manage-
ment systems and are increasingly using risk- and value-based performance measures
using stochastic models (Comite´ Europe´en des Assurances (CEA), 2007; Klumpes, 2005;
Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Santomero and Babbel, 1997). Most dominantly, embed-
ded value in the life insurance industry is used as management control tool. While
embedded value should be considered an important step forward from the traditional
profit-based performance measures, it is still far from ideal because investment results
and underwriting results are evaluated integrally whereas separate results information
is necessary. To solve the problem of joint results information, we propose applying the
funds transfer pricing system in the fourth section.
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The concept of the funds transfer pricing system developed in the fourth section bears
important similarities with the replicating portfolio principle (Rubinstein, 2001; Broadie
et al., 1998). However, the replicating portfolio principle is often used as an input for
the micro-ALM strategy only. Below, we argue that it is important to extend the re-
sults to performance measures and macro-ALM to promote goal-congruent behavior
for both the investment and the underwriting centres. By using the appropriate perfor-
mance measures, the proposed funds transfer pricing system stimulates the underwrit-
ing centre to address investment consequences of the underwriting activities in advance.
In addition, the funds transfer pricing system impacts all macro-ALM components
and not only the investment policy. As a result, it promotes goal-congruent behavior
better.
From a management control perspective, two questions should be answered when ana-
lyzing performance
1. Did underwriting variables develop according to expectation?
2. Did investment variables develop according to expectation?
The controller1 of an insurance firm answers these questions integrally. That is, he/she
cannot address these questions separately, either in a profit-based or in an embedded
value-based system. As a result, the underwriting department lacks incentives to im-
prove poor underwriting results when investment results are good and vice versa. The
reverse holds for the investment department.
However, the controller should answer the two questions separately for three reasons.
First, instruments to alter the performance are different. Underwriting results can be
improved by pricing and reinsurance decisions whereas investment results can be im-
proved by asset allocation and (de)hedging decisions. Second, an integral perspective
fails to have a steering function because there is no “alarm bell” for one unit if inci-
dentally the other unit performs well. In a situation of goal congruence, both units aim
to perform well independently from each other. Third, there is no two-way relation
between the investment policy and the actuarial and premium policies. Mostly, the in-
vestment policy “follows” the actuarial and premium policies, but there is no feedback
loop. As a consequence, an underwriting department can sell unhedgeable embedded
options without properly charging the client for it. This is what happened during the
1990s in many countries (Mercer Oliver Wyman (MOW), 2004). The investment depart-
ment seems to be “responsible” if interest rate developments result in an unhedged
in-the-money embedded option.
Concluding, we identify the following problems in insurance with respect to ALM. The
current situation does not satisfy the necessary conditions for effective control (de Leeuw,
1990) and does not enhance goal-congruent behavior (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2003).
The problems are:
1 We use the term controller/risk manager interchangeably because we believe that the combined
efforts of these functions form an adequate management control system.
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1. Management has an inadequate model and inadequate information of an insurance
policy as performance and risk are measured integrally (violation of conditions 2
and 3).
2. The insurance unit lacks the appropriate instruments to influence effects of all
value changes of investments. This includes value changes due to credit spread
and default as well as embedded optionalities (violation of condition 4).
3. The insurance unit has no incentives to design products that can easily be matched
on the financial markets. There is no feedback from the investment units to the
insurance units.
4. The insurance unit has no incentives that limit granting free embedded options,
which are costly for the investment unit and as a result for the organization as a
whole.
5. The investment centre is incentivized by the underwriting centre (rather than
management) to invest in more risky securities when the latter wants to set a
lower premium.
The next section evaluates the method with which banks resolved similar problems. The
fourth section discusses the application to insurance firms.
THE FUNDS TRANSFER PRICING SYSTEM IN BANKING
A similar matching issue exists in banking. A bank’s business model is built upon the
transformation of the maturity- and liquidity-specific character of funds (Allen and
Santomero, 1999; Schierenbeck, 2003; Gorton and Winton, 2002). The transformation
function raises the issue on how to allocate the interest rate margin and consequently
interest rate risk (Kimball, 1997; Kafafian, 2001). Schierenbeck (2003) develops the so-
called “Marktzinsmethode.” This is an example of the funds transfer pricing system in
which the contract rate of a transaction is compared with a transaction with equivalent
maturity characteristics (both maturity-specific and liquidity-specific characteristics) on
the interbank market.
Exhibit: Example of Funds Transfer Pricing. Consider a bank issuing a 10-year mort-
gage of €100,000 at 6 percent, funded with a €100,000 savings deposit at 3 percent.
Combined, these two transactions are quite profitable: the interest rate margin is 3 per-
cent, that is, €3,000. How should we allocate the profit to the two products? For both
products, the profitability is determined by comparing the contract rate with its inter-
bank equivalent, the opportunity costs. The total result (€3,000) is separated into three
components: a commercial margin on the mortgage (€1,000), a commercial margin on
the savings deposit (€500), and a transformation result (€1,500). Figure 1 is a graphical
representation.
A central component of the funds transfer pricing system is the transfer price (Chitten-
den, 2000). In the opportunity cost perspective, the performance of a unit must reflect
the additional return compared to other opportunities (Schierenbeck, 2003). As inter-
bank opportunities are widely available for the bank, it is common to take the interbank
rates as transfer prices, or more precisely, matched-fund transfer prices (Payant, 2000).
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FIGURE 1
Funds Transfer Pricing System Splits Banking Result Components
Element of Exhibit 
Mortgage 6,000 000,3    € €    Savings Deposit
)elbairav ,%3()dexif ry 01 ,%6(
Interbank Loan 5,000€    3,500€ Interbank Loan
)elbairav ,%5.3()dexif ry 01 ,%5(
Commercial Result 1,000 005    € €
005,1tluseR noitamrofsnarT €     = (5%-3.5%) x 100,000
000,3tluseR latoT €     = 1,000 + 500 + 1,500
This transfer pricing schedule ensures goal-congruent behavior of commercial units
(Kafafian, 2001).
The funds transfer pricing system resolves the allocation of the mismatch results by
separating the mismatch and the two components of commercial results (Schierenbeck,
2003). Although it is originally developed to allocate results, it also separates the risks.
Hence, it makes the banking business more controllable. Each risk component is sepa-
rated to a level that it can be separately steered by a responsibility centre. Schierenbeck
(2003) states that from the controlling perspective, the funds transfer pricing system is
fair on the aspect of causality as well as performance because business units can in-
fluence their contribution only through means of setting better rates than the market
equivalent (i.e., transfer price).
APPLICATION OF THE FUNDS TRANSFER PRICING SYSTEM TO INSURANCE
In this section, we investigate how to implement the funds transfer pricing system in
the context of insurance, satisfying the following criteria:
1. Performance (risk and return) should be measured uniquely; that is, any interfer-
ence between different risks should be avoided.
2. Performance (risk and return) should be allocated to the unit that drives/causes
the risk.
3. The unit that the risk is allocated to should have instruments available to manage
the risk.
The Concept
In the second section, we introduced underwriting results and investment results. Ac-
cordingly, we define two responsibility centers: the underwriting centre and the invest-
ment centre. The underwriting centre is responsible for selling insurance policies for a
fair actuarial price. Such a fair price (Babbel et al., 2002) takes into account underwriting
risks only. The underwriting variables are evaluated on a best-estimate basis rather than
on the traditional prudent basis. The underwriting centre invests its liabilities internally
in the investment centre. As a result, the underwriting centre is perfectly matched.
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TABLE 1
Objective and Performance Measures Using the Funds Transfer Pricing System in Insurance
Underwriting Centre Investment Centre
Objective Managing underwriting position by
selling insurance policies
Managing mismatch position and
capital base by investing in asset
portfolio
Performance Added underwriting fair value Fair value investment returns
Risks Underwriting risk, unhegdeable
embedded options
Market risks (predominantly interest
rate risk) and credit risk
RAROC Added underwriting fair valueEconomic capital
Added investment fair value
Economic capital
Investment risks are transferred through internal transactions to the investment cen-
tre, responsible for the assets and the mismatch. The internal transfer price excludes
investment risks. Investment returns are generated from taking investment risks and
managing the mismatch only. In addition to managing the mismatch position, the in-
vestment centre manages the so-called free assets (Booth, 1999) that cover the (equity)
capital base of the insurance firm in excess of the insurance liabilities. Table 1 depicts
this situation.
While the banking version of the funds transfer pricing system identifies three respon-
sibility centers (lending, deposit taking, and treasury), the insurance version identifies
two responsibility centers. This is because the mismatch of banking in itself is profitable.
Hence, in banking there are three separately identifiable return drivers. Clearly, that is
not the case for insurance. The mismatch of an insurance firm arises because some assets
are nonexistent and because it is profitable to invest part of the assets in non-risk-free
securities. Hence, in insurance there are only two return drivers as identified above.
The Transfer Price
An important element in this concept is the internal transfer price (cf. AMIfs Research
Committee, 2001). The transfer price should clearly separate the underwriting and the
investment centre (Harris and Raviv, 2005). It should stimulate goal-congruent behavior,
partly by applying fair value (Calandro and Lane, 2004), both for the underwriting and
for the investment centre. Also, the transfer price should avoid suboptimal behavior of
both centers.
Anthony et al. (1992) argue that “. . . transfer pricing is not primarily an accounting tool.
Rather it is a behavioral tool that motivates managers to take the right decisions.” To
provide the right incentives, it is important that the underwriting centre bears no invest-
ment risk. Therefore, the internal transfer price should be risk free, that is, government
bond rates or interbank swap rates (for those maturities for which government bonds
are unavailable). This makes the system consistent with the applications in banking. A
practical difference between the banking and insurance application is the focus on liq-
uidity in banking. Normally, insurance liabilities are less liquid than banks’ on demand
deposits. Hence, the insurance funds transfer price focuses on interest rate maturities
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only. By taking the risk-free rate as the internal transfer price, we decompose the total
risk into two mutually exclusive parts: the investment risk and the underwriting risk.
The transfer price based on risk-free rates for internal transactions fulfils the goal-
congruence criterion because it clearly demarcates the difference between risk-free and
risky investment of the liabilities. Hence, such a transfer pricing system satisfies Anthony
et al.’s (1992) criteria for effective use of transfer pricing.
Taking the risk-free rate as transfer price assumes absence of systematic risk for un-
derwriting risks. For the underwriting risks, this is a reasonable assumption because
underwriting risks can be mostly diversified away by pooling (e.g., in one portfolio
or by means of reinsurance contracts). Some underwriting risks may be less well di-
versifiable and hence include systematic risks, such as catastrophic event risks (e.g.,
pandemics, flooding). These risks should be incorporated in the fair value of liabilities
including a separate market value margin, reflecting unhedgeable risks (International
Actuarial Association (IAA, 2007; CEA, 2005; Federal Office of Private Insurance, FOPI,
2006). Hence, also for these liabilities the risk-free rate is used as funds transfer price.
For the shareholder—interested in the risk and return of the insurance company as a
whole—compensation of the systematic risks is addressed in the sum of fair value profit
of underwriting and investment centres.
The Underwriting Centre
The objective of the underwriting centre is to maximize fair value by managing the un-
derwriting position of the total insurance firm. The fair value (International Accounting
Standards Board, 2004) of an insurance policy is the net present value of the expected
cash flows discounted by the risk-free rate and based on best-estimate expectations
of the underwriting variables. A market value margin is added to reflect unhedgeable
risks. When selling an insurance policy, the underwriting centre must assess all actuarial
expectations to derive the expected cash flow pattern. It invests this expected pattern
internally in a series of risk-free bonds. This encourages the fair pricing of insurance
policies and adequately captures the time effect of the liabilities. In addition, embedded
options such as guaranties must be hedged internally as well. This forces the underwrit-
ing centre to identify and quantify embedded derivatives and avoids the writing of free
guarantees or other embedded options without the sellers of the policies being charged
for it. In the framework of responsibility accounting, the underwriting centre should
bear the cost of such embedded options. Because liabilities are invested internally at the
product level, performance may be assessed at product level as well.
However, some embedded options like lapse options and combined guaranties are not
hedgeable with financial instruments. Therefore, they cannot be hedged via internal
transactions. These embedded options remain in the book of the underwriting centre.
By explicitly identifying them, the underwriting centre is encouraged to adequately
price and manage these embedded options.
The performance of the underwriting centre is the added fair underwriting value during
a particular period. For existing business, the created fair value may change due to
changing expectations in the underwriting variables. When underwriting variables’
expectations are stable, the performance of existing business equals exactly the risk-
free rate. This value is created because the underwriting centre has gone through an
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additional period and the discounted future cash flows are discounted by one period
less. Additionally, the underwriting centre realizes the budgeted market value margin
in this period as a compensation for bearing the underwriting risks.
The risk of the underwriting centre is due to outcomes of the underwriting variables
compared to actuarial expectations. As is increasingly common in the insurance industry,
economic capital is the central risk measure (Zaik et al., 1996; Drzik, 2005). In our article,
we treat economic capital as a given quantity. The major risk for a nonlife underwriting
centre is volatility in claim pattern causing a direct volatility in the fair value. The major
risk for the life underwriting centre is that small volatility in a particular year will
magnify over a long time horizon. Both effects are adequately captured in the economic
capital on a fair value basis (cf. Doff, 2006; IAA, 2004). As a consequence, the relative
performance measure is RAROC as the ratio of added underwriting fair value and the
economic capital (Zaik et al., 1996; Saita, 1999; Schierenbeck, 2003).
In the second section we indicated that the underwriting performance should be evalu-
ated as the difference between actual and expected underwriting variables. This is also
reflected in the fair value of the underwriting centre. There may seem to be an incentive
for the underwriting centre to estimate the expected claim costs too high in order for the
underwriting centre to increase the fair value profit over the subsequent years. This is in
line with current actuarial practice to estimate claim costs prudently and subsequently
realize a run-off result. However, misestimation of claim costs results in a too low fair
value profit when selling the product. Another potential consequence of misestimation
of claim costs is a too high pricing, which is also (commercially) unfavorable for the un-
derwriting centre. Because the funds transfer price is the risk-free rate the underwriting
centre does not earn a real return on the prudence margin in the liabilities. Because
misestimation is ignored in the performance measure of the underwriting centre the
incentive to misestimate the claim costs is neutralized.
The underwriting centre is evaluated on its economic capital only. The book value of
equity capital on the balance sheet of that particular legal entity does not play a role in
performance evaluation. Hence it is possible for the insurance firm as a whole to manage
the available book capital base in an optimal manner, irrespective of where it is located
exactly.
The Investment Centre
The investment centre manages the assets covering the insurance liabilities (mismatch
position) and the free assets. Because all assets are fair valued (mark-to-market), the
performance measure of the investment centre is added investment fair value. Risk is
evaluated by economic capital as the overarching risk limit. Consequently, RAROC is
the relative performance measure of the investment centre.
Taking It All Together
Let us now evaluate whether we have solved the problems as identified in the second
section. Fair value is the central performance measure for the funds transfer pricing
system in insurance with economic capital as the central risk measure. Fair value and
economic capital are evaluated for the underwriting and investment centre separately
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and then aggregated to arrive at total fair value for the entire firm. As a result, both
performance and risks are well separated and the funds transfer pricing system provides
management with adequate management control information. Problem 1 of the second
section is resolved. Both responsibility centers can steer their performance uniquely, that
is, without interference of effects beyond their control. This resolves the problem 2 as
well.
Problems 3 to 5 are related to goal congruence. These problems have all been resolved by
choosing the appropriate transfer price. Alternatives to choose different transfer prices
have not been evaluated because the risk-free rate already resolves our problem.
This means that we have also satisfied the criteria we laid out in the beginning of the
fourth section because performance and risk are measured uniquely and allocated to the
responsibility centre that has the instruments to manage the risk.
One remaining question is: if applying the proposed funds transfer pricing system
is such a sensible thing to do, why have insurance companies around the globe not
implemented such a system yet? In the second section we concluded that insurance
firms’ ALM strategy is executed relatively separate from the underwriting business, but
that performance measures continued to be integral. In the second section we noted the
importance of goal-congruent performance measures. Based on disclosed information
by insurance undertakings, we observe an increasing importance of embedded value.
We argued in the second section that embedded value as a performance measure also
takes into account an integral perspective. Anecdotal evidence shows that some leading
insurers are in the process of implementing the funds transfer pricing system in order
to resolve the problems highlighted in this article.
A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE2
We investigate the funds transfer pricing system in an example with a traditional life
insurance product. It is bought by a 50-year-old client at a premium of €60,000 at t = 0.
The policy pays a lump sum of €100,000 at the age of 65 or 90 percent of that amount
at death, if earlier. For simplicity, we assume a simplified mortality rate structure: the
probability that the policyholder dies at age 64 is 0.25 and the probability that he survives
age 65 is 0.75.
In traditional terms, the embedded value is calculated by discounting future expected
cash flows with a 10 percent discount rate because this is based on a long-term average
investment return. However, at this moment the government bond yield is 4 percent.
For simplicity, we ignore expenses and lapse rates. Therefore, the embedded value is
€36,121, because at t = 0 the net present value (NPV) of expected benefit payments
is €23,879 (see Table 2). The underwriting manager may (incorrectly!) interpret the
embedded value to be a 66 percent profit margin (i.e., 60,000/36,121×100 percent = 166
percent). Hence, he has an incentive to either decrease premiums or increase benefit
payments, for instance, by guaranteed investment returns. When the investment return
turns out to be low, this is an incentive to assume additional investment risks to make
up the losses.
2 This section is derived from Doff (2006).
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TABLE 2
Performance Evaluation Under the Traditional Embedded Value System
Underwriting Centre t = 0 t = 1
Premium (= a) €60,000 €60,000
Benefit at alive (t = 15) €100,000 €100,000
NPV (r = 10%) €23,939 €26,333
Probability of alive 0.75 0.80
Expected value (= b) €17,954 €21,067
Benefit at death (t = 14) €90,000 €90,000
NPV (r = 10%) €23,700 €26,070
Probability of death 0.25 0.20
Expected value (= c) €5,925 €5,214
Total expected value (d = b + c) €23,879 €26,280
Value new business (t = 0) (= a − d) €36,121
Embedded value profit (t = 1) €2,401
Investment return (8%) €4,800
Total performance €36,121 €7,201
During the first year, two circumstances occur. First, mortality expectations change. The
probability of dying at age 64 (t = 14) changes to 0.20 and probability of surviving age
65 (t = 15) is 0.80. Second, the actual investment return is 8 percent, earned over the
invested premium of €60,000. Hence, the profit of this policy is €7,201 (see Table 3). It
is mainly caused by discounting the cash flows 1 year less. The adverse effects, such as
the negative developments in mortality and investment returns are hardly visible. As a
result, there is no incentive to take measures.
Implementing the funds transfer pricing system separates the underwriting centre from
the investment centre. As the government bond rates are 4 percent, this is also the
transfer price and hence also the discount rate used in the fair valuation of the insurance
liabilities. The fair value of the insurance liabilities is €54,638 and this is transferred
against the risk-free rate to the investment centre. The budgeted underwriting profit
is €7,547 including the benefit on the internal transactions (see Table 3). This is a 13.8
percent profit margin (7,547/54,638×100 percent = 13.8 percent). The 1-year budgeted
profit of the investment centre is the expected 10 percent investment return over the
€60,000 premium less the costs of the internal transactions.
During the first year, the same two circumstances occur (mortality and interest rates
change). Now that the two responsibility centres are separated, the two effects are sep-
arately visible (see Table 3). The underwriting centre has a profit of €4,556, which is
significantly lower than under the traditional embedded value system. The loss due to
the decreasing mortality rate is neutralized by the discounting effect. There is an incen-
tive to manage benefit payments and potentially hedge the risk of further deterioration
of mortality rates.
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TABLE 3
Performance Evaluation Under the Transfer Pricing System
Underwriting Centre t = 0 t = 1 Investment Centre t = 0 t = 1
Premium (= a) €60,000 €60,000 Asset portfolio €60,000 €60,000
Investment return (10%) €6,000
Benefit at alive (t = 15) €100,000 €100,000 Investment return (8%) €4,800
NPV (rf = 4%) €55,526 €57,748
Probability of alive 0.75 0.80 Replicating portfolio €54,638 €54,638
Fair value (= b) €41,645 €46,198 Paid transfer price (4%) €2,186 €2,186
Benefit at death (t = 14) €90,000 €90,000 Fair value profit €3,814 €2,614
NPV (rf = 4%) €51,973 €54,052
Probability of death 0.25 0.20
Fair value (= c) €12,993 €10,810
Total fair value (d = b + c) €54,638 €57,008
Earned fair value (= a − d) €5,362 €2,370
Received transfer price €2,186 €2,186
Fair value profit €7,547 €4,556
Total performance of the two responsibility centres €11,361 €7,170
TABLE 4
Summary of Incentives in the Example
Performance Measure t = 1 Incentive
Traditional performance measures
Embedded value profit €7,201 Decrease premiums
Provide investment guarantees
Funds transfer pricing system
Underwriting centre €4,556 Manage claim benefits
Hedge mortality risk
Investment centre €2,614 Take balanced asset risk
Total profit €7,170
The investment centre gains a profit of€2,614 by investing the premium against 8 percent
(which is lower than the budgeted 10 percent) funded by the internal transactions.
Hence, the investment centre still makes a profit, but less than expected. There is an
incentive to improve the returns, for instance, by assuming a balanced investment risk.
The investment centre can optimize its investment strategy by trading off risk and return.
At t = 1 the sum of underwriting and investment centre is €7,170, which is €31 lower
than in the traditional calculation (Table 4). This is because the 10 percent discounted
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budgeted investment returns are already taken at inception, that is, before they are
realized.
CONCLUSION
The current practice of ALM in insurance firms fails to satisfy conditions for effective
control and fails to reflect goal congruence. This causes management control problems so
that managers are unable to run their business effectively. This could result in unintended
risks for the insurance firm as a whole. We showed that the funds transfer pricing system,
a well-established system within banks, can be implemented in insurance.
We argued that implementing the funds transfer pricing system in insurance promotes
goal-congruent behavior and resolves the management control problems. It requires
identifying two separate responsibility centers: the underwriting and investment centres.
The underwriting centre matches its insurance liabilities through internal transactions
with the investment centre. As a result, the investment risks are uniquely allocated to the
investment centre. Hence, applying the proposed transfer pricing system in insurance
companies satisfies the conditions for effective management control as also highlighted
in the simple although practical example.
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